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BOOK REVIEWS

The Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries, by Michael J. Perry. Oxford
University Press, New York, 1998. Pp. 162. $35.00 (Hardcover), $14.95
(Paperback).
J.L.A. GARCIA, Boston College
This slender volume (about 106 pp. of text) comprises four chapters,
each treating succinctly, and sometimes superficially, an important question about the possibility, foundations, or nature of human rights. The
author is a noted professor of law and a liberal Catholic thinker who
recently has admirably critiqued the 'gag-rule' propounded by neutralist
liberals against appeals to religious faith in public political discussion. He
has also argued, less admirably, against orthodox Christian morality'S condemnation of homosexual acts. This book follows the same pattern, showing Perry generally right-headed and sometimes incisive in his criticism of
some contemporary secular theorizing, but revealing him as too willing to
trim traditional Christian moral thought to accommodate current trends.
Perry's first question is whether the idea of human rights has an intelligible secular version. He claims the idea of human rights has two "parts,"
first, that everyone is "sacred, inviolable," possessed of "inherent dignity
and worth, ... an end in himself," and second, that because of this, certain
things ought be done for everyone, and others ought not be done to them.
Perry effectively shows the emptiness of legal theorist Ronald Dworkin's
recent attempt to reinterpret the claim that every human life is sacred
while dispensing with God. (And with the claim that people ought not be
killed before birth or when they despair late in life). For Dworkin, a human
life is sacred because it represents an investment of human and natural creative work, which he finds wondrous. Perry nicely points out that this "life
as a masterpiece" - understanding of sacredness does not make its sacredness inhere in human life, and seems to make its value dependent on our
fleeting, inconsistent, and variable sense of wonder.
Perry may interpret Dworkin uncharitably in seeing him as making the
sanctity of human life depend on our feelings. Still, even Dworkin's less
subjectivist argument to sanctity from the value of the natural and human
"investment" represented in each human life fails. For any butterfly also
represents a great natural investment (biological, physico-chemical, climatological, etc.) in its generation and sustenance, yet butterflies lack human
(or human-like) rights. Moreover, if what is distinctive about humans is the
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self-investment we make in our lives, then circularity threatens. For it is
hard to see why human time and effort matter so crucially unless we
humans are somehow antecedently special. So, human distinctiveness is a
presupposition of that argument, not its conclusion.
Some seek to justify human rights by appealing simply to the definition
of 'moral.' Perry is right that this approach raises the question, 'why be
moral?' Unfortunately, he regards this question as more serious than it is.
After all, an adequate response will point out some way in which being
moral is good, but in a way which the questioner may not care about or
may care about less than she cares about some competing matter. So, it may
fail to motivate the individual. The serious question is whether being moral
is justified. But that is already settled by its being good. Someone whose
decision against violating other persons is made simply as a means to her
own personal interest doesn't genuinely respect their rights, and is not acting
from the moral virtue of justice. Perry appears to recognize that the kind of
non-interference that Hobbesian accounts justify falls short of genuine
morality. However, his own preferred "justification" of human rights is also
in terms of the agent's "flourishing" and is therein also self-interested, and
instrumental, falling short of full justification for the same reason. What is
needed here is a dose of Levinas' insight that being moral cannot be merely
a means to any nonmoral project. We can ask whether being moral, including being just in respecting others' rights, can ever "payoff" someone. But
even if it can, as Jews and Christians believe (and Aristotelians and Stoics
did too), we must still recognize that being moral is not something we can
do simply as a means to such a pay-off. To be moral, to be virtuous, is centrally to love and cherish persons for their own sakes, not just divine persons but also human, and not only one's own person but also others'. It is
not only the religious who can find this the most rewarding life. However, it
plainly makes no sense to care for others for their own sakes simply in order
to reap its rewards-whether they are conceived as Hobbes' desire-satisfaction, Epicurus' pleasure, or the "flourishing" Perry borrows from Aristotle.
This is one reason only those who lose their lives-i.e., abandon them in loving service-will regain them (Matthew 16). Perry appears not to appreciate
the way in which "Why be moral?" is a valid theoretical question, but of no
direct practical import. In any case, Perry needs to clarify whether he thinks
sacredness is internal to human rights. If so, then the definitional and
Hobbesian strategies, pace his claim, are not really defenses of human rights
talk at all, since they purposely eschew human-sanctity.
I think sanctity-claims may be part of the best defense of human rights,
since otherwise it is difficult to see why disrespecting people, harming them,
betraying them, and failing (in one's relationships with) them is so significant morally. I am inclined to think that sanctity-claims are not part of
human rights themselves. If that is right, then definitional and self-regarding
strategies are genuine accounts of human rights, but poor defenses of them.
We should note in passing that the claims that there are some things that
we ought to do to people and other things we ought not do to them, which
according to Perry are the second part of the idea of human rights, cannot
themselves suffice for rights talk. They do not specify that the violations are
morally wrong rather than merely ill-advised, nor that they are acts of
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wronging, of victimizing. After all, I ought not to destroy my couch, but

doing so need not be morally wrong. It's just stupid, imprudent. I also
ought not trash your couch but, again, my trashing it is not a violation of the
couch's rights. More is needed for human rights than such bare 'ought'claims as these. Perry may well be right that human rights can be understood in terms of the kind of 'ought'-claims that natural law grounds. Still,
he moves too fast in going from these' ought'-claims to human rights talk.
Perry correctly points out that Rorty's anti-foundationalist position simply abandons the efforts to justify rights talk. Nevertheless, the brief critiques of Dworkin, Rorty, and a few other contemporary thinkers only
skim the surface of recent efforts to defend human rights in our age of neoKantian moral philosophers. In general, there is just too much here on
Nietzsche. A century since of efforts at a gentler, more loving, more
respectful post-Christian secular morality gets short shrift.
Perry's second, and shortest, chapter answers the question whether the
discourse of international human rights is corrupted in the ways that Mary
Ann Glendon argues U.S. rights-discourse have become. Perry quotes from
major rights documents to show that they do not subordinate all other concerns to rights-claims, discredit compromise, abort discussion, shortchange
such intermediate institutions as family, and so on. Perry largely succeeds
in his unambitious goal, but his discussion is interesting mainly for what it
omits. Recently some critics, most notably Glendon herself, have charged
that international rights discourse is becoming Americanized, especially in
the Cairo and Beijing U.N. Conferences, and in some responses to the U.N.
Declaration's fiftieth anniversary. (Recently, a population conference in
New York insisted on the reproductive "rights" of teenagers.) These critics
contend that the Clinton Administration and its West European ideological
allies elevated some lifestyle and sexual rights to the level of inviolability
and used terminological tricks-especially replacing talk of "family" with
coded phrases about diverse forms of "families," for instance-to blunt the
effectiveness of appeal to those institutions against demands to license perverse individual "life-style" preferences under the rubric of human rights.
Since Perry does nothing to address this important contemporary controversy, his discussion here is largely irrelevant.
The third chapter inquires whether human rights and all other moral
norms are so relativized to local cultures that appeal to inherent and universal rights must be wrong-headed. Again, he is on the right side, arguing
in the negative. Unfortunately, his argument, while touching some important but familiar points, does little to advance the discussion. Readers interested in responding to relativism are better advised looking to MoodyAdams, Wiredu, Scanlon, et a1. than to Perry's brief treatment. Perry's
argument is marred by its focus on a straw man, as he expends much of his
limited space showing that such acts as torture are bad for their victims
irrespective of the latter's nationality, religion, etc. Plainly, that is not what
the relativist challenge to human rights is about. Rather, the relativist
maintains that, while the torture is bad for its victim, that does not always
suffice to make it a violation of her rights, since she holds that rights are
cultural creations and may in some societies be withheld from certain or all
classes of people. So, Perry's discussion here is insufficient and misdirect-
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ed. He further confuses matters by claiming to endorse a form of "cultural
relativism" himself, though he holds only the uncontroversial position that
some universal norms will require different conduct in places and cultures
differently situated. It is not wildly inaccurate to call this 'relativism' but
doing so certainly obscures issues it ought to clarify.
Perry abandons the side of good sense altogether in his final chapter.
Here he responds negatively to the question whether any human rights are
exceptionless norms. His discussion is confused in its basic terms. He
notes, for example, that some of the principal documents of human rights
include ceteris paribus clauses in their affirmation of rights and concludes
that the rights are not absolute. However, if your doing something to me
always violates my rights except when you do it for some specific reason
(whatever that is), then your doing it without that reason is wrong without
exception. So, Perry is an absolutist too, malgre lui.
We get the same conclusion from another angle. He sides with the proportionalist moral theologians who hold that one's overriding duty is
always to promote "the greater good." This is called anti-absolutist, but it
is plain these thinkers count something as wrong in every instance: promoting a lesser good. The point is that we're all absolutists. The dispute
is over just which acts are wrong absolutely. Perry warns darkly that
such absolutists as the Oxford legal theorist John Finnis offer no convincing defense against the charge that their position is fanatical. However,
one who, like Perry, professes his approval of doing absolutely anything
to secure a better result is in no position to call others fanatics. Finnis is
Perry's special target there, but this misdirects the chapter's discussion.
Perry makes a fuss over criticizing the claim of Finnis, Germain Grisez,
and others that life and other fundamental forms of human good are
"incommensurable" a claim they make to bolster the traditional view that
lying, blasphemy, and intentionally killing innocents, for example, are
acts never permissible. Yet even if there is, as it seems reasonable to
think, some sense in which the result of an act that causes two deaths is
worse than that of an act that causes just one, it remains to be shown how
one moves from that observation to the contested view that morality permits and even requires killing one person to save two. That is a question
not just about the good but about the right and Perry offers no theory to
back this conclusion. Instead, he maintains, with some misgivings, that
traditional absolutism is counterintuitive. This is interesting mainly for
the fact that only a few decades ago even defenders of utilitarianism conceded that it was their anti-traditionalism that offended their readers'
moral intuitions. Perry may be right that nowadays his readers' intuitions are likely to run the other way. I think this shows that the theorist's
appeal to moral intuitions should be done carefully, with intuitions like
those Perry (correctly or not) claims duly discounted as rather unreliable
turns of thought, untested, of unproven staying power or lasting appeal,
temporally and spatially localized accoutrements to those of a certain
class and educational background.
What matters here is that Perry's explicit suggestion that it might
involve no immorality, no violation of human rights, to threaten and kill
someone's innocent loved ones to get her to reveal the location of a ter-
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rorist bomb (his example) is wildly and plainly inconsistent with his
own insistence on the sacredness, sanctity, and inviolability of human
beings (he uses the three terms as rough equivalents) that grounds
human rights. His (and, for that matter, any) efforts to overcome this
incompatibility fail miserably. More important, an inviolability that
countenances such blatant violations-egregious instances of what Kant
memorably called treating others "merely as means"-cannot ground any
human rights that are worth a damn. The reason Perry seems not to see
this is that he works with an impoverished understanding of love.
Christian love is love of persons as neighbors, not a devotion to promoting any such dubious abstraction as the greater good. To love anyone is
to wish her well, and it is not hard to see that intentionally depriving her
of so fundamental good as her life, solely for the benefit of others, cannot but be the antithesis of acting lovingly toward her. Of course, we
cannot in the real world bring every good thing to every person. But
then it is reasonable to think that love serves to limit the extent to which
we can licitly set ourselves against anyone person's retaining such fundamental goods as life itself without having done anything to cut herself
off from deserving our consideration.
It is Perry's fondness for the shallow and inept theorizing of proponents of the discredited moral theological school called 'proportionalism' that bogs his discussion down throughout this final chapter. (For a
critique of this school see the papal encyclical Veritatis Splendor or Chris
Kaczor's work.) Some legal theorists do even worse by him, leading
Perry to absurd musing about whether killing innocents for others benefit might be unobjectionable if they might be induced to vote for a policy
permitting it, or if a majority accepted such an arrangement. None of
this makes much sense-surely the decent would look to the morality of
killing for guidance on how to vote, not see it as emerging from the toteboard. It reveals the emptiness of much of what passes for moral theory
in this Rawlsian time, when people have become used to the idea that
moral norms are creatures of hypothetical (and even actual) political
agreements. Near his book's end, Perry charges Finnis with holding that
it is better for the whole nation to perish than for one person. Actually,
this seems to be a misinterpretation of the latter's position, for Finnis'
claim that fundamental values are not objectively commensurable
entails that no such comparative judgment of superiority, inferiority, or
equality can be correct. More important, however, is the fact that Perry
would make this complaint. Has he given any thought to the context of
the famous claim that it is better that one man die than the nation? What
has beclouded our thinking when professed followers of Christ proclaim
an ethic indistinguishable from the one Caiphas both practiced and
preached? Perry's morality countenances vicious victimization of some
for the sake of others; but such single-minded devotion to the purported
greater good is the code of oppressors. What we need is moral thinking
that follows not the thinking of the victimizer, but the moral understanding of The Victim.

